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This article examines the recent rise of Islamophobic narratives in the Chinese cyberspace. 
Using content analysis of social media headline articles, this article argues that key 
Islamophobic actors in the Chinese cyberspace have constructed a ‘victims and villains’ 
narrative to effectively ‘other’ Muslim populations in China. By implying that non-Sinicised 
Muslims are under Arab fundamentalist influences, religious autonomy becomes political 
betrayal and Islamophobia is legitimised. Elements of Islamophobia is then subsumed in the 
official narrative calling for ethnic loyalty to the Chinese nation, which presents a unique 
challenge to the Chinese Party-state as Islamophobic discourses both legitimises state-
sponsored autocratic control in Muslim regions, but also could potentially bring 
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Introduction 
The rise of Islamophobia in the West in recent decades is a well-documented phenomenon. 
Right-wing politicians and political groups in the West have been able to manipulate and 
amass support by highlighting the so-called ‘Muslim problem,’ and the idea of Muslims and 
Islam being a threat to Western values and security is described as the ‘green scare’ or the 
’green peril.’ 1 Therefore, Islamophobia implies hatred or animosity aimed at Islam and 
Muslims.2 It is not new: it has been associated with orientalism, whereby the West associated 
Islam and Muslims with exoticism and negative stereotypes. Contemporary uses of 
Islamophobia first entered public discourse after the 1997 Runnymede report by the British 
race relations NGO the Runnymede Trust.3 However, like all contested and politicised 
concepts, Islamophobia is difficult to define.  
Although the definition of Islamophobia can be shifting and context-specific, the increasing 
consensus is that Islamophobia should be seen as a form of cultural racism, where “cultural 
signifiers are used to manifest essentially fixed characterizations among different groups in 
society, and these differences are essentially ‘insurmountable.’”4 This calls upon a ‘us versus 
them’ belief system where a “homogeneous and static culture with specific and deleterious 
characterizations” is recognised, and anything that does not fit within the cultural system is 
rejected.5 Contemporary Islamophobia predominantly situates the ‘other’ within a Western 
geographical context. Contemporary practices that reflect the idea of an inner threat are 
visible in migration control, the surveillance of Muslim citizens, and the overall practices of 
geopolitical empire.6 In British newspapers, for example, Muslims are presented as culturally 
deviant and so a threat to British culture.7 Hence, Marranci argues that “Islamophobia is not 
an unfounded hostility against Islam, but a hostility that has its last raison d’être in the fear of 
multiculturalism and its consequences.”8 
 
1 Jens Rydgren, ‘Immigration Sceptics, Xenophobes or Racists? Radical Right‐Wing Voting in Six West European 
Countries’, European Journal of Political Research 47(6), (2008), pp. 737–65. Matt Carr, ‘You Are Now Entering Eurabia’, 
Race & Class 48(1), (2006), pp. 1–22; Liz Fekete and Ambalavaner Sivanandan, A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and 
Islamophobia in Europe, (London, Pluto Press, 2009). 
2 Brian Klug, ‘Islamophobia: A Concept Comes of Age”, Ethnicities 12(5), (2012), pp. 665–81. 
3 Gordon Conway, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, (London, Runnymede Trust London, 1997); Erik Bleich, ‘What Is 
Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept’, American 
Behavioral Scientist 55(12), (2011), pp. 1581–1600. 
4 Fred Halliday, ‘‘Islamophobia’ Reconsidered’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(5), (1999), p893. Sabine Schiffer and 
Constantin Wagner, ‘Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia-New Enemies, Old Patterns’, Race & Class 52(3), (2011), pp. 77–84. 
Etienne Balibar, ‘Is There A 'neo-Racism'?’, Race and Racialization: Essential Readings, 2007, pp. 85–88; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Touchstone, 1997). 
5 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (Fully 
Revised Edition), (London, Random House, 2008). 
6 Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, (London, Haymarket Books, 2012). 
7 John E. Richardson, (Mis) Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers, vol. 9, 
(Amsterdam, John Benjamins Publishing, 2004). 
8 Gabriele Marranci, ‘Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilisations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia’, Culture and 
Religion 5(1), (2004), pp. 105–17. 
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Since the September 11 attack, the subsequently declared and US-led high profile ‘Global 
War on Terror’ has subsumed focal insurgencies and other ‘little wars’ waged on Muslims 
across the globe.9 With the rise of right-wing politicians such as Donald Trump, most debates 
on populist discourses such as Islamophobia in recent years have been focused in contrast to 
pluralism and democracy, predominantly looking at Anglo-American and European societies. 
Less attention has been paid to how these views manifest in authoritarian states. This article 
examines the recent rise of Islamophobic hate speech in the Chinese cyberspace, especially in 
the context of the renewed emphasis on the Sinicisation of Islam in the official narrative.  
Using content analysis of social media headline articles, this article argues that key 
Islamophobic actors in Chinese cyberspace have constructed a ‘victims and villains’ narrative 
to effectively ‘other’ Muslim populations and cultures in China. Those who are socialised 
into being Muslims, usually Uyghurs, are portrayed as innocent and deceived victims, thus 
can be ‘awakened’ and ‘saved’ through Sinicisation; whereas those who knowingly take 
advantage of ethnic policies and religious affirmative action are seen as villains, thus branded 
as traitors of the Chinese nation. By implying that non-Sinicised Muslims are under Arab 
fundamentalist influences, religious autonomy becomes political betrayal, and Islamophobia 
is legitimised. Elements of Islamophobia is then subsumed in the official narrative calling for 
ethnic loyalty to the Chinese nation, which presents a unique challenge to the Chinese Party-
state as Islamophobic discourses both legitimise state-sponsored autocratic control in Muslim 
regions, but also could bring destabilisation to an already fragile ethnic relationship between 
Muslim minorities and the Han majority.  
Sinicisation of Islam as Official CCP Narrative 
The concept of Sinicisation of Islam was first introduced in the Academic Symposium on 
Islam in November 1980, in Yinchuan, Ningxia. The idea was controversial at the very 
beginning, with some scholars applauding and supporting the notion and others criticising it 
as being historically backward. Since the April 2016 National Religious Work Conference in 
Beijing, however, Sinicisation of Islam was officially instated as government policy, and all 
debate regarding the legitimacy and practicability of the concept had ceased. Instead, 
discourses have emerged in Chinese academia in full support of official Sinicisation, which 
seeks to legitimise the ‘othering’ of non-Sinicised Chinese Muslims. For instance, one CASS 
scholar10 wrote:  
The Arabs in the peninsula are a backward group lacking in culture… when they 
conquer a region, they can only offer the locals Islam and the Quran. Everything 
else they assimilate from local cultures. 
 
9 Abdulkaroom Vakil and Salman Sayyid, Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2010). 
         10CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. CASS is the foremost Party-sponsored social science research institution in 
China, under the direct supervision of the CCP and the Ministry of Propaganda. 
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Quoting Engels, he argued that the Arabs were the conquered, whose ‘barbaric nature meant 
they had to assimilate to the better economic conditions of their conquered cultures”.11 
CASS scholars usually argue that historically, Islam was Sinicised successfully.12 However, 
they also warned that contemporary Islam in China is at the risk of Arabisation, with many 
Chinese Muslims becoming ‘spiritually Arab,’ and numerous aspects of Chinese Muslim 
territories taking on Arab features such as the building of Arab-style mosques and the 
adoption of Arab-Muslim clothing.13 
In line with the nationalistic ‘Chinese sovereignty must be protected’ narrative, CASS 
authors often suggested that if Islam is not Sinicised, then China will end up like Central 
Asia, where ‘domestic peace was disturbed due to an influx of Islamic and foreign funding.’14 
Scholars are very wary of Saudi Arabia in particular, warning that de-Sinicisation of Islam 
will mean Islamic parts of China will turn into Saudi Arabia, asking, “and how many 
countries want to be like Saudi Arabia?”15 All foreign influence is labelled extreme, coming 
from the Wahabi or Salafi sects, who have ‘ulterior political motives.’ They typically 
conclude that Islamic fundamentalism is at the root of the spread of the de-Sinicisation and 
Arabisation of Chinese Muslims, a ‘dangerous course’ that must be corrected.  
In line of such narratives, the continued Sinicisation effort has led to a socio-spatial hierarchy 
of Muslims in China: those who are most Sinicised and living closest to Han populations are 
seen as the most acculturated and accepted, such as the urban Hui of China’s coastal region, 
while the ethnically distinct Uyghur living the peripheral regions of Xinjiang away from Han 
majority areas are seen as at the risk of succumbing to separatism and foreign fundamentalist 
influence. This is also reflected in the mainstream everyday discourses, which sees Chinese 
culture as the mundane, and any minority cultures as the exotic.16 Influenced by the secular 
Communist ideology, the Chinese Han usually views religion as anti-modern.17 In the case of 
Islam in particular, it has been reported that the doctrine has been perceived as ‘too strict’ and 
‘feudal,’ creating ‘pious disciples’ who, because most of them in Han-dominated regions are 
 
11Yijiu Jin, ‘三论伊斯兰教在中国的地方化和民族化 [The Third Debate on Localisation and Nationalisation of Islam in 
China]’, Journal of Northwest University for Nationalities 4(4), (2015), pp. 1–8. 
12Weijian Li, ‘伊斯兰教中国化的历史经验与现实分析 [The Historical Experience and Realistic Analysis of the 
Sinicization of Islam]’, Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism 2(2), (2018), pp. 127–33; Yijiu Jin, ‘The Localisation 
and Nationalisation of Islam in China’, Study of Islam 1(1), (1995), pp. 1–8; Jianwu Ma and Qixin Song, ‘伊斯兰教在中国
的本土化探析 [An Exploration of Sinicisation of Islam in China]’, Journal of Northwest Minzu University 5(5), (2007), pp. 
94–97. 
13Li, ‘The Historical Experience and Realistic Analysis of the Sinicization of Islam].” 
14Jin, ‘The Third Debate on Localisation and Nationalisation of Islam in China].” 
15ibid. 
16 Jörg Friedrichs, ‘Sino-Muslim Relations: the Han, the Hui, and the Uyghurs”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37(1), 
(2017), pp. 55–79. Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the 
Legitimation of Exploitation, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993). 
17 Lin Yi, ‘Culturalism, Education and Islamophobia in China’, in Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 185–95. 
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self-employed, are also seen as ‘unscrupulous merchants’ in favour of profit rather than 
education.18  
Similar to the cultural racism argument in the West, there is an element of culturalism in the 
Islamophobic discourses in China. For instance, Yi argues that ‘prejudice or discrimination 
against ethnic minorities as a whole is ingrained in China’s ancient culturalism and manifests 
itself through shifting discursive repertoires depending on the differing historical 
circumstances.’19 Central to this culturalism is the idea that China was the only true 
civilisation, and non-Chinese can be legitimised through the civilising effect of (Confucian) 
education, which further affirms Han superiority.20 This fluid, instrumental way of identity 
construction inevitably lead to the construction of ‘others’ who are seen as barbaric or 
inferior. The intrinsic alienness of the other does not matter as much as their willingness to 
assimilate. Ironically, the ethnogenesis of peripheral groups is likely to develop as a reaction 
to these civilising discourses or projects.21 
Xinjiang has witnessed increased securitisation since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and events 
and debates surrounding the ethnic issue in Xinjiang have gained prominence in the public 
domain following the 2014 Kunming attack and the introduction of state re-education 
camps.22 Bolstered by official narrative and policies, Islamophobia has become increasingly 
prevalent online in the last few years with the central idea that Muslims in China have to pick 
sides: they must either be Sinicised or Islamicised and Arabised, with the former choice 
denoting peaceful integration, and the latter choice signalling sinister associations with 
extremism.  
Methods 
This article draws material published by a well-known Islamophobic account on Weibo, with 
more than 337,000 followers. Although this is by far not the most impressive follower 
number in Chinese cyberspace, it is worth noting that Islamophobia is not condoned officially 
in China, and any openly inflammatory content is frequently censored. Indeed, Weibo has 
made several attempts to ban and delete the account, causing the author to lose followers as 
he is forced to migrate. However, content that is not openly calling for ethnic violence and 
conflict do evade censorship, and they remain in wide circulation. The specific account used 
for this article’s analysis is one of the current backup accounts, began in 2016. Using the 
Weibo headline article function, this account periodically pushes out news and commentary 
from Islamophobic opinion leaders across the Chinese cyberspace. Thus it serves as a useful 
 
18 Lin Yi, ‘Ethnicization Through Schooling: the Mainstream Discursive Repertoires of Ethnic Minorities’, The China 
Quarterly 192, (2007), pp. 933–48. 
19 ibid. 
20 James Townsend, ‘Chinese Nationalism”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 27(27), (1992), pp. 97–130. 
21 Stevan Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2011). 
22 Sean R Roberts, ‘The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs’, Critical Asian Studies 
50(2), (2018), pp. 232–58; Joanne Smith Finley, ‘Securitization, Insecurity and Conflict in Contemporary Xinjiang: Has 
PRC Counter-Terrorism Evolved Into State Terror?’, Central Asian Survey, 38(1), (2019) pp. 1-26, 
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source to assess key Islamophobic narratives present in the Chinese Internet. For this article, 
a total of 155 headline articles published between 2016 and 2018 were collected, then coded 
and analysed using NVivo 12.  
The Victim Narrative: The Deceived vs. The Oppressed 
All of the articles sampled have particular recurring key agendas and narrative themes. These 
agendas can be summarised into two categories: those who have suffered under the evils 
brought by Islam and Muslims (the victims), and the agents assisting the spread of such evils 
(the villains). One of the key questions asked by Islamophobic actors in Chinese cyberspace 
is: if Islam is an evil, then who are its victims? Here, two distinct forms of victim narratives 
emerge: those who are deceived and trapped by Islamic teachings, usually Uyghur Muslims, 
and those who are oppressed by the special privileges afforded to Muslim minorities, usually 
the Han.  
In the deceived victim narrative, the Uyghurs are portrayed as an ethnic minority population 
who have accepted Islamic practices unthinkingly, and lack agency in fighting against 
“religious extremism” encroaching on their freedom. Consequently, the narrative focuses on 
the ‘awakening’ of the Uyghurs, by emphasising the distinction between ethnic and religious 
identity and reminding them of their overarching Chinese national identity. By doing so, the 
narrative effectively ‘others’ the Uyghurs who do choose to subscribe to their Muslim 
identity, as the choice is seen as un-Chinese.  
I want to say to all Uyghur children: you are not born Muslims! You are citizens 
of the People’s Republic of China, and you are the hopes and dreams of the 
Chinese nation.23 
These articles often repeat and stress that Uyghurs are not necessarily Muslims, hence 
throwing into question why Uyghurs have to follow Islamic traditions and practices such as 
halal. Halal, meaning permissible and originally used to denote ‘pure food,’ is generally 
referred to as qingzhen in China, meaning clean and good, and an indication that the product 
has a Muslim provider. Like halal practices across the world, qingzhen practices are deeply 
contextualised and represent a constant negotiation between the ethnic identities of the 
Muslim population, government policies, and the “Islamic”/“Chinese” culture.24 While the 
government seeks to regulate, certify and brand halal and qingzhen, it is, in reality, a term 
that signifies faith and practices embedded in everyday lives: being Muslim as well as the 
way of life.25 Nevertheless, the authors of the Islamophobic pieces placed a significant 
emphasis between religious identity and ethnic identity and suggested that Uyghurs accept 
 
23 Xiaogu Wang, ‘我叫王小古，我孩子名字我做主 [My Name Is Xiaogu Wang, I Shall Decide What I Will Call My 
Children]’, Weibo, October 10, 2018, accessed September 23, 2018, 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404293375334470051. 
24 Johan Fischer and Yukari Sai, ‘Muslim Food Consumption in China: Between Qingzhen and Halal’, in Halal Matters: 
Islam, Politics and Markets in Global Perspective, (London, Routledge, 2015), pp. 170–84. 
25 Min Su, ‘捍卫 ‘清真”: 世界宗教, 迷信与鲁西南回民的伊斯兰想象 [Defending ‘Qingzhen”: World Religion, 
Superstition, and Islam Phenomena of Luxinan Huimin]’, Religion and Anthropology 00(00), (2012), p6. 
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religious practices not because of their own volition, but because they are afraid of social 
ostracisation, thus framing Uyghurs as powerless victims bound by peer pressure. While 
Uyghur society has been observed to conform to community and peer pressure, the authors 
imply that religious peer pressure has sinister intentions that are forced upon the 
impressionable Uyghurs.26  
Some Uyghurs can say that they are not Muslims, but their way of life still has 
religious elements. Are they really choosing not to use technology or eat pork 
because they can’t get used to it? Or are they afraid of being punished by some 
religious law that they themselves did not even choose to subscribe to?27 
We Uyghurs are kidnapped by our religion because we are afraid of being treated 
as the odd one out if we don’t follow practises such as halal…We just go with the 
flow.28 
It is worth noting that these articles often equate extremism with any ostentatious religious 
practice, especially those seen as un-Chinese. This is in line with state counter-extremism 
laws issued after 2018, which named the wearing of Burkas, ‘unnatural growth of beards,’ 
and ‘overtly religious names’ as extremist behaviours.29 Drawing on similar interpretations, 
religious beliefs and practices are often referred to as ‘chains,’ ‘shackles’ or ‘cages,’ which 
the Uyghurs were unable to break free by themselves.  
We need to differentiate between ethnic traditions and religious traditions, and 
break free from the cage of ‘halal thought’.30 
Everyday I feel like I am wearing an invisible shackle, and I can’t breathe.31 
Despite the repeated emphasis on the distinction between ethnic and religious practices, the 
writers of such pieces never made clear what ‘non-religious ethnic traditions’ were. Instead, 
the narrative focused on how religious practices were socialised and never questioned. It is 
portrayed that the spread of such religious practices is recent developments: authors often 
 
26 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur, 
(London, Brill, 2008); Joanne N Smith Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations 
in Contemporary Xinjiang, (London, Brill, 2013). 
27 Eysa Raxman, ‘不做宗教习俗的傀儡 [Do Not Become Puppets of Religion]’, Weibo, September 16, 2018, accessed 
September 23, 2018, https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404284899656920836. 
28 Murat Kurban, ‘一名维吾尔族发声亮剑：消除陋习，做移风易俗的共产党员 [a Ughyur Announces: We Should 
Destroy Old Habits and Be Secular CCP Members]’, Weibo, September 20, 2018, accessed September 23, 2018, 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404286130752214751. 
29 ‘新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification]’, Peoples 
Daily, April 1, 2017, accessed September 23, 2018, http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0330/c186332-29942874.html. 
30 Mohammad Ismail, ‘认清’泛清真化”的背后阴谋 [Beware of the Conspiracy Behind "Pan-Halal"]’, Weibo, September 
22, 2018, accessed September 24, 2018, https://media.weibo.cn/article/amp?id=2309404286989057824514. 
31 Ayjamal Ahmad, ‘冲破民族堡垒：嫁给汉族胖子是我最幸福的事 [Overcoming the Ethnic Barrier: Marrying a Han 
Person Is the Best Thing I Did]’, Weibo, October 13, 2018, accessed September 23, 2018, 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404294631209729165. 
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made nostalgic comments about their childhood where they did not follow halal practices 
strictly and could freely mix with their Han neighbours. 
I was born in the 1970s… my neighbours back then were all Han. During the 
holidays we invited everyone around, so we had Han food as well. My father 
didn’t have this halal or non-halal differentiation and we enjoyed both halal food 
and Han food, as we liked. We had no differences with the Han, we were a family 
albeit with some language barriers.32 
While the claims of free intermingling made in these nostalgic pieces can be called into doubt 
(for instance, social, spatial and symbolic segregation has been in place since the 1980s,) 
nevertheless they strove to emphasise the ideas that Xinjiang had always belonged to China, 
and all Chinese were one and the same, which fits in with the state-sanctioned narrative of a 
unified and harmonious China.33 The authors then go on to argue that in recent years, a 
‘religious atmosphere’ has overtaken the Uyghur community, which allowed extremist ideas 
to proliferate. One author warned:  
If we do not discard religious practices, our ethnic group will be kidnapped by 
religion, our tradition will be replaced by religious tradition, and we will lose 
ourselves and become puppets of religion. 34 
By arguing that halal and other religious practices are non-ethnic and non-traditional, the 
authors have drawn the link between halal practices and extremism, and others Islamic 
practices as non-mainstream, and hence non-Chinese.  
If Uyghurs want to assimilate into the big family of the Chinese nation, then we 
have to say no to extremist ideas… assimilate into the mainstream, not asking the 
mainstream to accommodate us. Leave halal to religion, and return freedom to the 
people! 35  
These narratives mainly present Uyghurs as having no agency or proactive awareness in 
following religious practices, hence allowing them to be portrayed as ‘innocent.’ This is 
particularly important because there is evidence to suggest that Uyghurs communities have 
been activating and exaggerating certain religio-cultural differences (the practice of halal in 
particular) as a means of ensuring symbolic, spatial and social segregation from the Han, 
which was observed as early as 1995.36 However, such behaviour does not fit the official 
 
32 Mijiti Qadir, ‘一名维吾尔族：推翻清真围墙，别让饮食禁忌祸害了我们 [From a Uyghur: Down with the Halal Wall, 
Do Not Let Us Become Poisoned by Religious Food Abstinence]’, Weibo, October 3, 2018, accessed September 24, 2018, 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404291094471932405. 
33 Finley, The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. 
34 Raxman, ‘不做宗教习俗的傀儡 [Do Not Become Puppets of Religion].” 
35 Ismail, ‘[Beware of the Conspiracy Behind "Pan-Halal"].” 
36 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, ‘Temperamental Neighbours: Uighur-Han Relations in Xinjiang, Northwest China’, Imagined 
Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity 5, (2002), p. 57; Joanne N. Smith, ‘‘Making Culture Matter’: Symbolic, 
Spatial and Social Boundaries Between Uyghurs and Han Chinese’, Asian Ethnicity 3(2), (2002), pp. 153–74. 
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narrative on ethnic harmony and the Chinese-ness of all ethnic groups. Grassroot narratives 
cannot counter the official discourse and suggest that Uyghurs are naturally un-Chinese — 
such attempts are seen as inciting ethnic hatred and will be immediately removed. In order to 
promote Sinicisation, then, agency must be removed from the Uyghurs, and any elements of 
symbolic protests downplayed. The deceived, innocent victim narrative thus allows the 
Uyghurs to be ‘purified,’ modernised and ‘enlightened,’ so long as they are Sinicised. Such 
narratives mirror the supporting discourses behind the instalment of state re-education camps 
in Xinjiang, where those ‘lost to extremist ideas’ are helped to ‘find their way back’ and 
provided with ‘employment trainings in order to build a better life.’37 
On the other hand, in the oppressed narrative lies the most common grievance of 
Islamophobic authors in the Chinese cyberspace: that the Han people, the majority ethnic 
group of China, has been putting up with unreasonable demands of religious affirmative 
action, and suffering under the state-sanctioned preferential policies for ethnic minorities. 
Here the focal point of complaint is not against the Uyghur minority but rather the Hui. 
Unlike the Uyghurs, whose genetic makeup and appearance are closer to that of the Turkish 
and Central Asians, the Hui look very similar to the Han. Religion then becomes their ethnic 
marker: in these narratives, the Hui are represented by their Islamic belief and their Islamic 
practices. Specific attention is given to how the Han, who are often the majority ethnic group 
in any social setting, have to tolerate religious taboos and practices of the Hui: 
China is the biggest consumer of pork in the world, and yet here we have halal 
flights and halal trains [to Hui populated regions] that don’t serve pork at all. This 
is not ethnic unity! If ethnic minorities have special dietary requirements, then 
they should tend to it themselves, rather than asking the majority population to 
compromise. 38 
In this topic, the authors appropriate the idea of ‘rights’ and argue that if Muslim minorities 
have a right to enjoy halal, then the Han majority must have a right to ask for non-halal food.  
Some people say this is for ethnic unity. Are you saying that in order to achieve 
ethnic unity, the Han must follow the Hui in not eating pork, following halal 
rules, and follow whatever habit the Hui have? This is not tolerance, respect or 
unity, this is oppression!39 
 
37 Xiaoming Liu, ‘Harmony in Xinjiang Is Based on Three Principles’, Financial Times, August 21, 2018, accessed 
September 26, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/05a81682-a219-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4. 
38 Han Eagle, ‘猪都到哪儿去了——主流媒体谈猪色变，原因在哪里？[Where Did the Pigs Go -- Why Are Mainstream 
Media So Afraid of Pigs?]’, Weibo, February 12, 2018, accessed September 25, 2018 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404206497788755984. 
39 Jinghong, ‘宁夏大学虽大，却容不下一个世俗餐厅？[the Grand Ningxia University Cannot Even Tolerate a Non-Halal 
Restaurant]’, Weibo, August 15, 2017, accessed September 25, 2018, 
https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404141131012171183. 
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The authors reject the idea that halal provisions in Muslim minority populated regions are 
meant to promote ethnic harmony and emphasise that the Han people have already been 
losing out economically as Muslim minorities receive certain halal food subsidies which the 
Han are not privy to. One article specifically attempted to calculate how much halal subsidies 
were given to Muslim populations in China and implied the money could be better spent 
elsewhere such as on children’s education in deprived areas. 
If you argue that Han can also eat halal, then I must ask you: why don’t everyone 
regardless of their ethnicity get beef and lamb subsidies? Surely you can’t have 
all the privileges? 40 
Similarly, as the food was cheaper in the subsidised halal restaurants in universities, the 
authors questioned whether this was unfair on Han university students, who had a limited 
budget. 
Halal restaurants are cheaper by a third and have bigger portions… to save 
money, I went to a halal restaurant once. In order to avoid having meat that was 
religiously treated, I only had the vegetable dishes, which cost me 3.5 yuan. If I 
went to a normal restaurant, [the same dish] would have cost me 7.7 yuan. Who is 
subsidising this?41 
The focal point of concern in these narratives was the oppressive nature of such ostentatious 
religious practice. Special attention is given to eye-grabbing cases where the concept of halal 
is misused, such as halal bread, halal water, and in one high-profile case, where a Hui patient 
demanded that he could only receive ‘halal blood’ from another Hui donor. Such use of halal 
symbols and concepts in products that are otherwise not in the halal purview are called ‘pan-
halal’ or ‘spread of halal’ [泛清真化] and is warned to be extremist.  
I have appealed to the public many times, and I don’t know what to say anymore. 
The root of terrorism lies in religious extremism, which is pan-halal, and pan-
Islamic practices! I will say no more!42 
Such loose-fitting definitions of extremism echo the state’s narrative on Uyghur terrorism, as 
the state counter-extremism guidelines explicitly state pan-halal as an extremist 
 
40 ibid. 
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manifestation, for providing means to ‘reject or interfere with secular life.’43 Regardless of 
their accuracy, such narratives are prone to become self-fulfilling prophecies.44 
It is worth noting that the accusatory pieces written from the Han point of view are not 
usually directed at the Uyghurs, as these are considered harmful to ethnic unity. Proactive 
admissions of guilt from reformed Uyghurs, however are a common tactic in the confessional 
pieces. Reform and repent pieces are also more likely to come from state and traditional 
media, as they serve to celebrate the success of the civilising mission. Grievance and 
accusatory posts, by contrast, are more likely to be censored, as they highlight ethnic tension 
and often call existing policies into question. In the model Uyghur pieces, Sinicised Uyghurs 
would note how unfair it was that the Han people were always accommodating minority 
lifestyles, thus legitimising the author’s argument that religious tolerance and affirmative 
action means sacrifices for the Han. 
In Xinjiang, whenever there is a gathering, if there is one ethnic minority then 
everyone will go to a halal restaurant for him or her. We just take it for granted, 
thinking that they have no dietary restrictions so it doesn’t matter where they eat. 
But this is completely ignoring their sacrifices.45 
I've seen a lot of Han cadres calling themselves by Uyghur names in Uyghur 
regions, to be closer to the people there. But most Uyghurs would think it’s 
deeply disrespectful to ask them to have a Han name. This is narrow-minded, 
nationalistic, and even extremist.46 
Another narrative tactic is drawing out how disenfranchised the Han has become in the face 
of positive discrimination for ethnic minorities.  
For Han citizens living in the North West minority populated regions, they 
wouldn’t get into conflict with ethnic minorities, and instead hide as far as they 
can. Why? They do not feel confident in law enforcement’s ability to make a fair 
judgement, when the other party are ethnic minorities. Not only that, but they also 
worry that they will be charged with crimes of disrupting ethnic harmony. 47 
Ethnic policies regarding university entrance exams and civil service entrance exams attract 
particular criticism, where affirmative action for ethnic minorities is seen to have caused Han 
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children to lose out. In an open letter written to the Guizhou government, parents of Han 
children cited that 44.96% of all university entrance exam takers in Guizhou in 2018 
benefited from affirmative action ethnic policies, with points added to their final score. They 
claim that such policies encourage ethnicity fraud, where parents deliberately ask to change 
their kid’s ethnicity category in order to benefit from the points-added scheme.48 In another 
viral news piece, it was revealed that a Han student in Guizhou dropped from first place to 
number 20 in the exam score rankings after all points-added calculations were made, having 
been side-lined by ethnic minority students. The article appealed to “save the Han kids!”, as 
this was seen to destroy the upward mobility chances of the Han students.49 In another 
commentary, the author suggested that the affirmative action policies were creating a caste-
like system in ethnic minority regions: 
Martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the Party, for the people and the country, 
can only have extra points added to their children’s university entrance exam 
scores, for one generation. The ethnic minorities, however, can enjoy extra points 
for generations to come, and become in essence life peers in our society through 
their ethnic minority identity! Are the blood of martyrs worth less than a piece of 
paper proving a person’s ethnic identity? This is an invisible caste system taking 
root in China! 50 
Unlike the deceived Uyghurs, the oppressed Han are portrayed to be in full awareness of their 
circumstances. It is suggested that the Han are naturally tolerant and have been tolerant for 
years, and they only chose to speak out because tolerance has now turned into injustice.  
For forty years, the Han people have tolerated unfair ethnic policies. As the 
majority ethnic group they have to be sacrificial, and understanding. However, 
some people keep challenging their bottom lines and threaten their survival, even 
kidnap their kid’s future! The Han people will not stand this any more, they are 
forced to speak out!51 
Overall, the narrative logic for the victim narrative can be briefly summarised as follows: 
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Figure 1: The Victim Narrative 
The Villains Narrative: Who is to Blame? 
While Islamophobic narratives are characterised by the hatred and animosity towards Islam 
and Muslims, the villains of the Islamophobic narrative in the Chinese cyberspace is more 
nuanced. According to the official Party narrative, Muslim ethnic minority populated regions 
are primarily threatened by Three Evils [三股势⼒], which means ‘terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism’, and Two-Faced Persons [两⾯⼈], a term used to describe those people who 
proclaim loyalty to the CCP in public, yet secretly work against the regime in private. The 
Three Evils, presumed to originate from foreign soil, are the masterminds behind Two-Faced 
Persons, who are portrayed as often having foreign connections or sponsors.  
As members of the socio-political elite, Chinese academics and politicians are among the 
most frequently attacked ‘villains.’ The embedded assumption is that as members of the elite, 
politicians and academics should protect Han interests and put the Han majority population 
first. Any deviation from this role immediately puts into doubt their loyalty to the Han, the 
CCP, and the Chinese nation. These narratives are essentially populist as they suggest that the 
elite class have betrayed the will of the people.  
In one commentary, the authors attacked a Chinese academic, Professor Zhang Haiyang of 
Minzu University of China, who questioned the CCP’s Sinicisation policy in Xinjiang and 
expressed concerns over the loss of Uyghur language after the introduction of mandatory 
mandarin lessons for the Uyghurs. By voicing such concerns, Professor Zhang was 
immediately put into the opposing ideological camp, which in this case, was the ‘Three 
Evils.’ 
Professor Zhang is the brainpower of China’s ethnic policy. He should be 
contributing to the peace and stability of the country, and instead he expresses 
extremist views like the terrorist group overseas. This makes one doubt what kind 
of stance the professor takes when doing research!52 
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In another instance, when history books were updated to replace the word ‘barbarian’ with 
‘ethnic minorities,’ the authors attacked academia, criticising and labelling all Chinese 
academics as ‘wolves with savage hearts.’ They claimed that this was ideological warfare, 
aimed at ‘wiping the slate clean’ and paving the way for barbarian invasion and domination 
of the Han.  
These wolves have infiltrated us and they are trying to destroy our national 
identity and cultural belonging. They are destroying our historical pride and 
honour! Those Han people who called the barbarian invasions as ‘ethnic 
minorities migrations’, they are numb and do not feel pain. Do they feel no shame 
in front of their slaughtered ancestors? 53 
Not only were the authors concerned about ‘ideological pollution and infiltration,’ but they 
also attempted to raise ‘empirical evidence’ that practices such as halal led to de facto ethnic 
segregation on campus. Examples were given on how halal food is heavily subsidised, non-
halal food was limited in choice, and how the provision of halal establishments led to the 
physical separation of students. Such policies were often equated with extremism, with the 
assumption that such exclusionary practices bred radicalisation.  
Many university offices publicly segregate student canteens… from halal 
canteens to no non-halal food allowed, to Muslim only seats and Muslim only 
canteens. We can see how extremist forces infiltrate our socialist campuses.54 
Whereas academics are often criticised in how they influence and enforce ethnic policy in 
higher education settings, the grievances against politicians are often directed at their 
inability to correct perceived wrongs. For instance, several articles raised the issue of the 
apparent de-Sinicising of local Mosques, where Arabic signs and plaques have been erected 
in place of Chinese ones. In the case of Yangzhou, the author wrote: 
What is more abominable [following the construction of the Arabic signs], is 
when Yangzhou citizens made an enquiring call to the Bureau of Religious 
Affairs, the person responsible said this is religious freedom, and not within their 
administrative purview!55 
The author questioned the purpose of the sudden de-Sinicisation, asking, “what is it trying to 
prove or achieve?”, implying that there are sinister forces at hand. Furthermore, the author 
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questioned the role of the officials in failing to safeguard against de-Sinicisation in 
Yangzhou: 
Why did the Bureau of Religious Affairs and the Planning Committees allow the 
construction of such religious symbols? Or did they just turn a blind eye? Is there 
negligence in this?56 
Similarly, when Muslim ethnic conflicts are reported in the media, the authors often complain 
that law enforcement fails to prioritise Han people or protect Han interests, and politicians 
fail to answer Han grievances. Instead, the justice apparatus is biased towards ethnic 
minorities, who are seen as unrepentant troublemakers:  
The incompetent politicians and bureaucrats are so used to just appeasing the side 
who can gather the most number of people and make the most noise, rather than 
deal with things fairly, justly and transparently. This means extremist groups get 
special privileges, and of course they just keep making trouble. 57 
This ties in with the Han as victims narrative, where authors claim that the Han are always 
losing out in ethnic conflicts because they are more law-abiding, and play by the rules, 
whereas the Muslim minorities do not subscribe to the idea of the rule of law. By using 
anecdotal evidence and focusing on crimes caused by Muslims in their articles, the author 
‘others’ Muslim minorities and further stresses the two ideological camps that exist in the 
narrative: the mainstream (Han) and the extremist other (Muslim).  
Even if the Han netizens scream hoarse in their protest online and ring the Bureau 
office phones off the hook, we would not attack the government buildings, 
because we understand the rule of law. Unfortunately, the quiet and law-abiding 
group always loses out. The politicians and officials just have to lay low and 
pretend to be deaf and mute for a few days, until the Internet moves on, and voila, 
all is well again!58 
Like other populist discourses, the Islamophobic narrative in Chinese cyberspace also views 
the Chinese media with distrust and often contempt. It is assumed that, like academics, the 
media has a role in influencing policy and the general populace. As a part of the mainstream 
(i.e., Han) culture, they must prioritise Han interests, and any hint of preferential treatment 
given to minorities are viewed with extreme suspicion. In a series of articles, the authors 
showed how state media outlets such as China Central Television (CCTV) and Xinhua News 
Network (Xinhua) had avoided the use of ‘pig’ and ‘pork’ when talking about Chinese new 
year traditions, a large part of which involves the procurement of pork for festivities. 
Allegedly, in light of heightened ethnic tensions in the year 2014, the media had changed the 
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mention of pork to other types of meat such as beef and lamb, and in some instances, forwent 
the mention of meat entirely. The authors named this phenomenon “swinophobia.”: 
Swinophobia is extremism, and any believers who support it are extremists. Any 
non-believers who support this are accessories to separatists and terrorists.59 
Having immediately marked the media as extremists in this case, the authors went on to 
explain why they think the media have acted in this way, portraying the media as a powerless 
and cowering institution enabling the advance of extremism in Chinese society:  
Traditional media and official new media are so afraid of pigs because they are 
afraid of the power of religious extremists. They clamoured to have the pigs 
removed because the media are afraid of them trouble-makers. The media are 
cowards, and they have self-censored for too long — they are used to licking the 
boots of extremists.60 
Similarly, when CCTV made a documentary series tracing some Chinese surnames to Arab 
origins, the authors strongly refuted the claim and criticised the media for selling the Han out. 
In another video where CCTV showed Chinese descendants living in Kazakhstan, the authors 
similarly expressed outrage as they argued that these people were descendants of Han traitors 
and were historically ‘evicted from China’ and should not be celebrated. They concluded 
that:  
We have so many Two-Faced Persons in the media and propaganda 
departments… they appear to work for ethnic harmony on the surface, but in 
reality they are trying to wipe out the historical memory of our national 
heroes…Doesn’t their conscience hurt? The media should have a moral bottom 
line!61 
Unlike the victim narrative, where the deceived and oppressed are portrayed as having very 
little to no agency and power in the spread of Islamic extremism, the villains narrative 
portrays these groups as villains precisely because it is assumed these groups do have the 
power and agency to stop the spread of extremism, but they have betrayed their people and 
the Chinese nation as they have either chosen to not act on their power, or misused their 
power for the opposing camp. Thus, there is a strong sense of guilty conviction in this 
narrative, which effectively frames the villainous groups as enemies of the Chinese people.  
 
59 Han Eagle, ‘[Where Did the Pigs Go -- Why Are Mainstream Media So Afraid of Pigs?].” 
60 ibid. 
61 Jinghong, ‘央视某些人，是蠢还是坏？ [China Central Television: Stupid or Evil?]’, Weibo, May 18, 2017, accessed 
September 23, 2018, https://www.weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404108659729811838. 
17 
Legitimising Islamophobia: Tactics and Approaches 
Reformed Uyghurs as Exemplars 
A specific type of article stands out in the overall Islamophobic articles sampled, which can 
be described as ‘model Uyghur’ or ‘reformed Uyghur’ pieces, in the sense that they are 
written by successfully Sinicised Uyghurs, serving as role models and exemplars. Among the 
articles sampled, more than a quarter were supposedly confessional or conversion pieces 
written by Uyghur authors. These articles follow a typical structure: 
 
Figure 2: The model Uyghurs narrative 
As the previous section has detailed, the pieces start with the proclamation that the Uyghurs 
were deceived and have followed religious practices and even extremist practices 
unknowingly. They are redeemed by the CCP, often after having moved to bigger, Han 
majority populated cities, or joined the state apparatus and coming into contact with other 
Party members.  
Following the ‘awakening,’ the Uyghur authors would often repent his or her previous 
mistakes, to mark their transition to a more ‘modern, forward way of thought.’ In a letter 
written by a Uyghur father to his daughter, for example, the father repents that he has been 
infiltrated by extremist religious thought despite his best attempts: 
You were always an active kid and wanted to try out new things when we went 
out. I had been picky about your food, telling you that these were not halal and 
you can’t have them. Now that I’ve come around, I realise how I was helping 
separatists and extremists in spreading their ideas! When you asked me why we 
can’t eat pork, I couldn’t explain it, so instead said offhandedly ‘because you will 
grow pig ears and pig’s nose!’ Now I deeply regret my words. I was not bringing 
you up right!62 
The Uyghurs authors would often remind their peers how much the CCP has helped the 
development of the Uyghur regions such as Xinjiang, and that they must appreciate the good 
life that they have now. This type of narrative echoes the CCP’s performance legitimacy, 
where the Party’s legitimate claim to rule is underlined by the economic growth and social 
development it is able to achieve.  
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The CCP has done so much for Xinjiang… [long paragraph of official statistics 
on Xinjiang’s development] All of these policies aimed at improving people’s 
livelihoods are the only one in the world, no other political party has ever been 
able to achieve this anywhere else. This is ironclad proof that the CCP is good for 
the people. Without the CCP, how can the people of Xinjiang live good lives as 
they do today? Isn’t this worth our gratitude, and forever loyalty?63 
Ironically, economic development in Xinjiang both demonstrates the state’s power and also 
reveals hidden tensions in society, especially as increasing numbers of Han people move to 
Xinjiang for large infrastructure projects.64 It was found in 2011 that Uyghurs earn 31 percent 
less than Han 65 and that the regional labour market continues to skew towards Han 
domination of high-status and high-wage positions, and Uyghur domination of low-status and 
low-wage positions.66 Thus, scholars have argued that the tensions between the Uyghur and 
Han are not primarily due to ethnic tensions, but rather due to ‘growing Uyghur perceptions 
of socio-economic inequalities between themselves and the Han.’67 In being deliberately 
panegyric of CCP’s economic achievements, these model Uyghur pieces are downplaying the 
nuanced reality of economic inequality in Xinjiang, and instead seeking to emphasise the 
paternalistic role of the Chinese state so that the larger debate of Uyghur-Han relations can be 
subsumed into the state nationalistic discourse. 
These narratives also present a simplistic division of ideological camps, where those who are 
unappreciative and not loyal to the CCP are immediately branded ‘defectors’ or ‘devils,’ and 
will come to regret their decision.  
Our motherland is like a giant protecting the 1.3 billion people living in it. Those 
who don’t value such a good life and illegally cross the border to join extremist 
groups will only experience homelessness, loneliness, and endless defeat 
abroad… only then they will truly understand the greatness of our nation. Think! 
Our great nation has given us a heavenly life, so how can we abandon our 
motherland and follow the devils instead?68 
Often these pieces end on a high, hopeful note, with the author expressing how proud they 
are of being conformed and Sinicised. Sinicisation is equated frequently with modernisation 
and forward-thinking, as well as assimilation in national identity.  
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Right now, all the comrades in our bureau are like one family. All of our canteens 
are now non-halal…we have broken the backward traditions in our ethnic 
practices and we have caught up with the times. We all feel that no matter our 
ethnicity, we are all Chinese!69 
Finally, these Model Uyghur pieces are written by Uyghur cadres who also actively 
encourage other Uyghur cadres to mobilise the masses and identify any possible Two-Faced 
Persons among them, suggesting that those who stay silent on the matter are automatic 
accessories to the separatists. 
Uyghur cadres must lead the charge on the war against separatism… we need to 
mobilise the masses, draw a firm line between themselves and the extremists, 
actively offer any useful clues as to where to catch the separatists…Anyone who 
doesn’t lead the charge or speaks out at this critical time is helping the separatist 
movement, and will become enemies of the people. 70 
There are a variety of ways for Uyghur cadres to lead the charge and demonstrate loyalty to 
the CCP, and writing such a piece to be disseminated is one of them. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that Uyghurs would submit these confessional pieces to avoid political trouble.71 
Other demonstrations include adopting Han names, giving up halal practices, and promoting 
mixed marriages between Han and Uyghurs. While there is no definite proof that these pieces 
are actual heartfelt works of Sinicised Uyghurs, this is not the only evidence of Uyghur-led 
Sinicisation effort. Uyghurs who are educated through the Han education route (i.e., 
attending Mandarin-taught schools), for example, often become teachers and teach Han and 
state-sanctioned ideas in Uyghur schools.72 The usage of these confessional/conversion 
pieces, therefore, add to the author’s arsenal in legitimising the ‘innocent yet deceived’ 
victim narrative they have constructed for the Uyghurs.  
Seeking Paternalistic Protection from Party State Narratives 
Furthermore, whereas Islamophobic discourses in the West focuses on the supposed cultural 
deviance of Islam and the Muslims to legitimise their claims, Islamophobia in the Chinese 
cyberspace emphasises the supposed political deviance of Muslim minority groups. Although 
the narrative is still underpinned by racist stereotypes, smear campaigns and conspiracy 
theories, all of these elements are ultimately legitimised or delegitimised through reference to 
official Party narratives. Xi Jinping’s speeches, Chinese law and constitution, and even 
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Marxism-Leninism have all been employed as a legitimising tool for their grievances. For 
instance, religious practices are placed opposite civil law: 
China is ruled by law, Uyghurs are Chinese citizens and should obey Chinese 
law… Why should our life be kidnapped by religious rules? Sisters and brothers 
of the Uyghur ethnicity! We must not make the mistake of taking religious rule as 
law again. 73 
The Party Constitution is selectively cited as reasons why Uyghur cadres must denounce their 
religion:  
As a Party member, we have to be atheists… and only subscribe to Marxism-
Leninism Maoism and Deng Xiaoping Thought according to the Party 
Constitution. 74 
The authors also legitimised their attack on the media by framing it as a loyalty test to the 
CCP:  
Whether the media dares to mention pigs is a good test, it should be the standard 
test to see whether they are loyal to the Party. Are they accessories to the Three 
Evils, or are they true Chinese patriots? Let’s see if they are brave enough to talk 
about pigs!75 
When the authors wanted to criticise politicians for failing to protect Han interests, they often 
did so by quoting the official speeches of higher-ranked officials and Xi Jinping, concluding 
that the politicians at the local level have failed to follow Party directives, thus legitimising 
their grievance. When netizens protested about the construction of a mosque in the city centre 
of Huainan, the local government censored much of the online protest, causing a significant 
backlash. In a popular commentary that followed, the authors quoted Xi Jinping’s speech in a 
cybersecurity workshop, where he said ‘we must be patient and tolerant with the netizens and 
listen to their voices’. This is followed by another quote from the editor from the People’s 
Daily, the Party mouthpiece publication, who said ‘propaganda departments must not simply 
delete public opinion online and pretend nothing has happened.’ Using these two speeches as 
legitimising cornerstones, the author went on to give policy advice to the local government, 
advocating a ‘more inclusive policy decision process that takes into account netizen’s 
feelings.’76 
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As it is still the official Party guideline to promote ethnic unity, Islamophobic actors in the 
Chinese cyberspace cannot frame their grievances to be overtly targeting Muslims on a 
religious or ethnic basis (although these posts are not uncommon, they are often quickly 
censored). Instead, the only type of grievance against Islam and Muslim minorities that can 
survive in the Chinese cyberspace are the ones that challenge their loyalty to the Party-state. 
Therefore, the core elements of Islamophobia are often subsumed in the official narrative 
calling for ethnic loyalty to the Party-state, and by extension, the Chinese nation.  
Conclusion 
This article has focused on grassroot Islamophobic narratives in the Chinese cyberspace, to 
illustrate how these discourses have developed certain patterns and sought paternalistic 
protection from the grander, official narratives of ethnic harmony and stability to legitimise 
their political grievances and messages. A key element found in both official and grassroot 
discourse on Islam in China is that both have framed Sinicised Islam to be peaceful Islam 
while non-Sinicised Islam to be Arabised, fundamentalist, separatist, and militant Islam. 
These discourses exhibit essentially populist features in that they focus on the negative 
labelling and ‘othering’ of Muslims and their related religious practices. By creating a 
narrative of victims and villains, they portray that Islam is quintessentially foreign, un-
Chinese, and so must be distrusted. Through the use of model Uyghur conversion pieces, they 
also advocate that the only way for Muslim minority populations to assimilate into Chinese 
society is to Sinicise and warns that any attempt that emphasises their religious identity and 
practices could be seen as a political and national betrayal.  
The end product of Islamophobic discourses and the social practices of discrimination and 
stigmatisation of Muslims in the West is the ‘act of physical racial violence carried out by 
individuals.’77 Although racial violence is less common in China, Islamophobic discourses 
circulating on Chinese social media websites have contributed towards offline discriminatory 
and trolling behaviour such as burying pig’s heads in front of mosque grounds.78 In light of 
increasing tensions over the rise of identity politics across the world, nascent Islamophobia in 
Chinese society should not be overlooked. Such grassroot Islamophobic discourses both seek 
legitimisation from and in turn further legitimises, CCP’s iron-fist rule of Muslim populated 
regions such as Xinjiang. Islamophobic actors in the Chinese cyberspace have the potential to 
stir up volatile and latent hatred in the populace and bring further destabilisation to an already 
fragile ethnic relationship between Muslim minorities and the Han majority.  
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